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THE PSYCHO-BIOLOGY OF CRIME
By Dr. Leo V. Tepley*
ICTOR HUGO states somewhere that Providence has
given every one his toy; the doll to the child, the child
to the man, the man to the woman, and the woman to
the devil. If he were living in this day, he would undoubtedly
have added-"and crime hysteria to the reformer, be he physician, lawyer, or social service worker." No subject in American history has occupied more printed matter or more public
attention within the last ten years than that of crime and the
so-called crime wave.
The more one reads, the more confused one becomes with
the explanations as to the cause of crime and the numerous
suggestions for the solution of the problem. Our entire present judiciary system, the reformers assert, is antiquated and
useless. All sorts of panaceas are offered in its stead. Some
propose the converting of the prisons into hospitals; others
view the criminal as something so deeply mysterious that only
experts in the fields of biology and psychology are capable of
catching a glimpse into his mind. The psychologist and psychiatrist, they believe, are the only living mortals competent
to handle and solve the crime situation. Then there are the
adherers to the famous Baumes Law, who believe that if three
doses of punishment don't cure an offender, he should be
locked behind prison bars for the rest of his life.
Statistical figures, to be sure, are employed by every student of the problem to support and prove the correctness of
his views. These figures prove one thing in the hands of one
man and diametrically the opposite thing in the hands of an*Editor's Note: This paper was presented before the Law Club by Dr. Tepley
and was found so interesting that his. consent to its publication here was secured. The
author has been much interested in matters of sociology and reform but with a keen
bent towards the practical. He is a leading specialist in Neuropathology, member-of
the State and City Medical Associations, member and fellow of the American Medical
Association, and a contributor to various medical journals.
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other. As one studies these figures, he wonders who originated
the myth that mathematics and statistics belong to the exact
sciences.
"Crime is on the increase. There is an enormous increase
in the prison population," thunder the "crimophobes". To
prove what an enormous increase in crime there has been in
the United States, one statistician brings forth these figures:
Cleveland, with a population of 800,000 had 2,327 automobiles stolen in 1921; whereas-London, with a population of
8,000,000 had only 290 automobiles stolen. It is indeed unfortunate for the United States that this statistician used auto
thieves instead of horse thieves. If he had substituted a horse
thief for an auto thief, our country would have undergone an
instantaneous metamorphosis; it would have become a country
almost free from crime, and London-just think how poor
London would have appeared if looked at thru the eye of the
quoted statistician! Liverpool had only ten automobiles
stolen in that same period. If here again we would substitute
the horse thief for the auto thief, Cleveland would be the
cleanest city in the world and Liverpool the mecca of horse
thieves. Murder statistics and other figures are used to prove
that "for every assault with the intent to kill in London, there
are seventeen in Cleveland." The statistician does not state
how he finds out that each assault in Cleveland is an "intent
to kill". One only hopes that he does not interpret many a
desperate look, a gnashing of teeth, a wild gesticulation, due
to a lack of knowledge of English, as an intent to kill.
One thing is apparently certain, however, and that is that
there is an increase in prison population. The alarm of the
crimophobes would be justified if the prison population were
the only thing that has increased within the last decade or
two. But is this so? Is there not even a greater increase in the
attendance of the Baptist Church, the Methodist Church, in
the number of Bibles distributed by the Gideons, in cases of
pernicious anemia and cancer, in divorces, in the movie industry and the number in colleges and junior high schools? The
fact is that the only things that have not increased of late are
the memberships in the Socialist party and in the American
Society for the Advancement of Atheism.
Crime is an objective term and is relative in character.
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An act which is considered and punished as a most serious
offense in one age is often a simple misdemeanor in another,
or perhaps no crime at all. According to Blackstone 160
crimes were punishable by death in the year 1765. In this age,
capital punishment is universally applicable for treason only.
Carver defines crime as "any act or omission to act which is
of so much public importance that society (law, either common or statute) takes notice of it and punishes it as a wrong
against itself." This definition, which is essentially correct,
may be paraphrased in these words: "Crime is an anti-social
act committed within society by some of its members who
do not act in conformity with the social standard." The
psycho-biologic nature of crime becomes apparent. It is a
human product. It is inherent in the human make-up. It is
as old as the human race. The fourth chapter of Genesis gives
a description of it which is second to none in literature. And
. . . "It came to pass that Cain brought of the fruit of the
ground an offering unto the Lord. And Abel, he also brought
the firstling of his flock and the fat thereof. And the Lord
had respect unto Abel and to his offering: but unto Cain and
his offering he had not respect. And Cain was very wrath,
and his countenance fell ....

And it came to pass, when they

were in the field, that Cain rose up against Abel, his brother,
and slew him. And the Lord saith unto Cain: 'Where is
Abel, thy brother?' And he said-'I know not, am I my
brother's keeper?' "
The son of Adam and Eve had all the components of the
modern criminal, Arthur Chatman, Loeb-Leopold, Edward
Hickman, and "our own" Eddy Ives-he was jealous, was
"very wrath and his countenance fell". He committed murder
and he lied. "Am I my brother's keeper?" Thus started
the Cains and their kind. The Lord God realized the seriousness of the situation and undertook most energetic measures
to combat crime.

"And now art thou curst from the earth .

.

when thou tillest the ground, it shall not henceforth yield
unto thee her strength; a fugitive and a vagabond shalt thou
be in the earth." The punishment meted out to Cain can
hardly be considered sentimental, for it was Cain's first offense,
but it failed to act as a deterrent. The Cains have kept on
appearing in our midst.
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Society first tried a criminal prophylactic measure. It
tried to eradicate murder by killing the murderer on the spot,
but it failed to exterminate the Cains. Gradually another
factor came into play--society learned that it didn't pay to
kill every one who even committed murder, for many of its
best fighters and aggressors thus became extinct. In other
words, society learned long ago- that all crimes are not equally
culpable. It then tried an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.
It tried mutilating the criminal by dismembering him or
branding him in ineffaceable ways. But the criminal did not
disappear from the face of the earth. In 1881 Alfonso Bertillon introduced the finger print system. Penologists were
very enthusiastic about it. That, they thought, would convince
the criminal that he could be identified beyond a doubt and
it would act as an effective deterrent. But the Cains kept on
multiplying.
About that time, Lombroso advanced the theory that
criminals were a distinct and special race, as it were. Following him there was a tremendous tendency to change the prison
into a kind of modified salon. Prison aid societies were formed
everywhere. Society was largely blamed for the criminal's
downfall. Social service workers made idols out of the prisoners. Probation and parole became very popular. They were
not only widely used, but equally widely misused and abused
by judges, prison wardens, and pardon boards alike. This
system of therapeutics naturally began to be disappointing.
The psychologist and psychiatrist came to the front. Every
offender was measured by the intelligence scale. The I. Q.
became proverbial. Every crime was laid at the door of an
inferior mentality. Other psychiatrists went further than
that. Complexes, sublimated ones and some not sublimated,
suppressed desires, painful infantile impressions were counted
as the cause of criminal behavior. Soon these enthusiasts too
began to lose their zeal and started looking for something
new.
And now along came Baume with his formula as stated
above. Already some psychiatrists and statisticians are claiming that in New York the existence of this law minimized
crime from 40% to 100% within two years of its birth.
One hundred and five years before Baume "discovered"
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his panacea, Edmond Livingston,. in Article 53 of his Code
of Crime and Punishment, wrote, "and if any person having
been twice previously convicted of crimes, no matter of what
nature., shall a third time be convicted of any crime afterwards
committed, he shall be considered as unfit for Society, and
be imprisoned at hard labor for life." This law was adopted
after the Civil War by Virginia, Ohio, and a number of other
states; like so many other panaceas, it was soon found to be
impracticable: it became mandatory first and was gradually
forgotten until Baume resurrected it in 1926.
One will hardly be considered an ultra conservative if he
feels sceptical about the miracles Baume's law has performed
in the State of New York. The deterrent effect of punishment
which seems to be the strongest element in this law can easily
be disregarded-it has singularly failed at all times and in
all countries. Roscoe Pound well expresses it in these words:
"The venturesome will believe they can escape, the fearless
will be indifferent whether they escape, and the crafty will
believe they can evade, and enough will succeed to encoutiage
others."
What is there then to be done about the crime situation?
The answer to this must be somewhat qualified. Before something constructive can be done, there are a number of things
that ought not to be overdone. The first of these is that the
crime problem ought not to be overdone. Impartial investigation will prove that there is no cause for alarm. The fact
that Cleveland, a typical American city, has more robberies
every year than all of England, Scotland and Wales together,
as some statisticians claim, does not prove in the least that
there is something organically wrong with the American soil.
If the crime alarmists, and those who worry about America's
future, would classify the culprits and place the un-americanized Englishman at the door of England, the un-americanized
Italian at the door of Italy, the un-americanized Bulgarian,
and all the others, at the doors of their respective countries,
they would soon find out that no tremendous increase in crime
has taken place on either side of the Atlantic Ocean.
There is no cause for alarm about an increase in crime.
We cannot compare two dissimilar objects and arrive at a
correct conclusion. It is fallacious to -compare the United
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States and Europe-the two worlds are in so many ways far
more different than alike. In New York adultery is legally
a crime, in London it is considered in the nature of a tort; in
Tennessee the teaching of evolution is a crime, in Edinborough, it is a virtue. And these examples say nothing about
the deep and subtle social, psychologic and sociologic differences.
The conclusion that the increase in prison population
means an absolute increase in crime is incorrect, and is very
much overdone. There are a great many people in this country and in Europe who do not consider those imprisoned because of prohibition, traffic, or narcotic violation as inherently
criminal. If these three types of prison inhabitants should
be removed from their lodging place, as some think they
safely might, the crime-fearing reformer would have to pray
to Providence for some other toy.
Within the last fifty years the United States has made
tremendous progress in every field of endeavor. The more
complicated, the more inter-dependent, the more progressive
the social organization has become, the greater has become
the necessary number of social prohibitions. The complicated
nature of a civilized society is beyond the psycho-biologic
make-up of a certain number of its members. This small
group is inherently incapable of adjusting itself to the high
level of the society into which Fate has thrown it. These
individualg are simply the social misfits. It is these misfitsintellectual, moral and social-that constitute, and will continue to constitute, the criminal element of society.
In our general advance in civilization, we have also succeeded in prolonging the span of human life for at least fifteen
years. This fact should have a very soothing effect on the
nerves of the crimophobes. It really means this: the misfit,
the social laggard, the criminal who twenty-five years agQ
was ready for the almshouse, is now still living, and by virtue
of general hygienic surroundings and public health that society has prepared for him, he is still capable of staging a
hold-up; the boy who twenty-five years ago was engaged in
pilfering, truancy, torturing animals, and other cruelties, is
now trying the art of safe-cracking.
As we have kept on changing from a lower to a higher
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level, our misfits, the criminals, too, have kept on changing.
The auto thief is taking the place of the chicken thief, the
gunman the place of the horse thief, the safe-cracker the place
of the highway robber. In other words, there is really more
of a change in occupation of the social misfit than there is an
actual increase in crime.
It is very doubtful indeed that psychologic and psychiatric nursing will ever succeed in inculcating the culprit with
that something which will prevent him, under all circumstances, from being anti-social. There is no basis for the socalled psychiatric viewpoint which holds that "scientific study
and analysis of the physical, chemical, biological, psychobiological, social and psychological factors entering into the
personality of the criminal are absolutely necessary before
very much can be understood regarding anti-social actions."
There is no good reason for adorning the culprit with all these
epithets. The criminal mind, so-called, is greatly overdone.
It is not nearly so deep, mysterious and enigmatic as it is
pictured in detective stories and allied literature. In a study
of 150,000 criminals, Dr. Goring, author of The English
Convict, states that the one outstanding characteristic of all
criminals is the stupidity of their crimes. The writer is rather
inclined to view the criminal mind as analogous to the lock
whose tricky creator offered a tempting reward to anyone
who could fit a key to open it. Various aspirants constructed
all manner of complicated keys and pried them into the keyhole, but the lock was unsubmissive. At last one contestant
cried, "I will pay this trickster double the reward he offers if
I am wrong in believing that there is no mechanism whatever
to this lock." He was right, for when they broke it open,
there was nothing but an empty space.
Louis Fishman's cry about the sanitary conditions of our
prisons doubtless reflects a deplorable condition, but neither
their conversion into the most immaculate lodging places, nor
the creation of psychiatric clinics and psychiatric commissions in our state penitentiaries are in the least bound to
ameliorate the crime situation. The newly born Jones Law,
Livingston's prescription for the habitual criminal resurrected by Baume, will be of no more value than many others
sought for panaceas. The universal application of Baume's
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law is soon likely to prove a great burden to society. It is
organically and inherently incapable of producing the desired
effect. Eighteenth century England in which pick-pocketing
was punished by public hanging is a striking example of the
failure of punishment to deter. I believe it is Charles Buckle
who chronicles that the greatest number of pick-pockets of
all time were rampant in the days of public execution. The
Cains were literally pursuing their trade in the-very shadow
of the gallows. A universal application of Baume's law is
bound to make the criminal reckless, since for any crime short
of murder, he gets the same term of imprisonment and is
deprived of a chance ever to reform. Often the prison will
become, as someone has remarked, a boarding place for the
young and a shelter for the old. There are numerous individuals who would under certain conditions commit more
than three offenses, and yet would never make a livelihood
by crime.
The indeterminate sentence, probation, and a parole have
still a place and are based on sound principle. They are not
only sound measures, but measures which peculiarly fit a
large number of individuals who are periodically thrown out
of gear, become anti-social, but who can be thrown back into
place with the expectation of staying adjusted for a considerable period of time.
A great deal can be accomplished in the direction of
crime prevention and crime repetition. A full realization
that no criminal should ever be deprived of the most fundamental attribute of the human make-up--namely, useful
work, is absolutely indispensable. Even those who instinctively abhor work will, under wise discipline, soon learn to
work, at first reluctantly, soon expectantly, and last eagerly.
The all powerful element of habit, the habit of work, is soon
likely to assert itself. In a great many cases, life itself may
assume a different meaning.
We need a sober, sane, and non-alarmist view of the true
nature of crime-first, last and always. We must not be
frightened by specters. We need not be fear-stricken every
time the radio announces that a Ford car has been stolen, that
our younger generation has changed from lovable boys and
girls into auto thieves. A complete eradication of the auto
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thief in 1929, even if it were possible, is not the least guarantee
for the prevention of the aeroplane thief in 1949.
The same is true about any other crime. Gradually, constantly and invisibly man is becoming more and more socialized. He learns how to curb his passion, and is conquering
his anti-social inclinations. Only in a state of complete millenium will society rid itself completely of crime. Until that
time, society will do well not to run astray either into the field
of the one who is governed entirely by the feeling of vengeance, or to the reformer who really has nothing to offer but
a lot of high sounding words and obscure phrases which he
believes to be panaceas.

THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
By James L. Goree of the Denver Bar

HE Federal Trade Commission was created by the Act
of Congress known as the Federal Trade Commission
Act, approved September 26, 1914. It consists of five
commissioners who are appointed by the President by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate. The appointive
term is seven years, and not more than three commissioners
may be members of the same political party. The present
members of the commission are Messrs. William E. Humphrey, a Republican, formerly a member of Congress from the
State of Washington, and now serving as Chairman of the
Commission, Edgar A. McCullough, a Democrat and formerly Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, Charles
W. Hunt, a Republican and an Iowa farmer, Garland S.
Ferguson, a Democrat and lawyer from North Carolina, and
Charles H. March, a Republican and lawyer from Minnesota.
The powers of the Commission were greatly enlarged by
the Clayton Anti-Trust Act, approved October 15, 1914; its
jurisdiction was extended to export trade by the Webb Act,
approved April 10, 1918; its jurisdiction was restricted by
the Packers and Stockyards Act of August 15, 1921, but was
further extended by the monopoly provisions of the Radio
Act of February 23, 1927. At the request of Congress or of
the President, or for the assistance of other government departments, the Commission has made numerous special investigations and reports, such as its study of grain marketing,
of the petroleum and fertilizer industries, of tobacco prices,
and of the production and distribution of coal. During the
war it exercised certain war-time functions and duties, and
certain other war-time duties and functions were conferred
upon it by executive order. Its activities immediately connected with the war were, of course, of great importance, but
as they are not matters of current interest, I shall not consider
them in this paper. The Commission has power to investigate
corporations engaged in interstate commerce (excepting banks
and common carriers) as to their organization, business, practices, etc., and to require reports and information from them
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in that regard. In passing I might say that these powers of
the Commission have been greatly curtailed by judicial decision. I shall address myself particularly to its quasi judicial
functions. They are vested in the Commission by Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act and Sections 2, 3, 7,
8 and 11 of the Clayton Act.
At the outset it is well to call attention to the fact that
the commerce clause of the Constitution is the basis of the
Commission's jurisdiction; so, with the exceptions hereinafter
mentioned, it has jurisdiction over persons, co-partnerships
and corporations engaged in interstate commerce but has no
jurisdiction over them when the commerce in which they are
engaged is wholly within state boundaries, or as it is sometimes called, intrastate commerce. I ask that this fact be kept
constantly in mind throughout my discussion. There are, however, some persons engaged in interstate commerce over whom
it has no authority, and they constitute the exceptions mentioned above. They are (1) banks, banking associations and
trust companies, jurisdiction over whom is vested by Section
11 of the Clayton Act in the Federal Reserve Board, (2) common carriers subject to the Acts to Regulate Commerce, jurisdiction over whom is vested by the same section in the Interstate Commerce Commission, and (3) packers, stockyards,
market agencies and dealers subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act, approved August 15, 1921, jurisdiction over whom
by that act is vested in the Secretary of Agriculture. Under
the Packers and Stockyards Act, the Commission retained
authority to proceed in cases against packers, stockyards, etc.,
in instances where complaints had been served before the
passage of that Act.
By Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, unfair methods of competition in commerce are declared unlawful. In his work on Unfair Competition, Mr. Nims thus
defines that term:
"The law of unfair competition is the body of rules created by the
common law of the United States (not by statute) to regulate the conduct
of those striving for good-will for themselves or for ill-will for their competitors."

Section 5 of the Trade Commission Act provides further
that whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe
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that any person is using any unfair method of competition in
commerce, and if it shall appear to the Commission that a
proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to the interest
of the public, it shall issue and serve upon such person a complaint, stating its charges in that respect, and naming a time
and place for a hearing. The person so complained of is
designated the respondent, and has the right to appear at the
time and place so fixed, and show cause why an order should
not be entered requiring him to cease and desist from the violation charged. Any person upon good cause shown may be
allowed to intervene and appear in such proceeding. The
testimony in the proceeding is reduced to writing and filed
in the office of the Commission. If, upon a hearing, the Commission is of the opinion that the method of competition in
question is prohibited by the Act, it makes a report in writing
in which it states its findings as to the facts; and issues and
causes to be served on the respondent an order, requiring it
to cease and desist from using such unfair methods of competition. If the respondent fails or neglects to obey such order
of the Commission, it may apply to the circuit court of appeals
of the United States within any circuit where the method of
competition in question was used, or where the respondent
resides or carries on business, for the enforcement of its order.
With its application it files a transcript of the entire record
in the proceeding. Upon the filing of such application the
court causes notice thereof to be served on the respondent,
and thereupon has jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the
question determined therein. Upon the pleadings, testimony
and proceedings set forth in the transcript, the court makes
and enters a decree, affirming, modifying or setting aside the
order of the Commission. The findings of the Commission as
to facts, if supported by testimony, are conclusive. Until a
transcript of the record has been filed in the circuit court of
appeals, the Commission may at any time upon notice modify
or set aside any such report or order made or issued by it.
Either party may apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence; and if such party shows to the court that
such evidence is material and that there were reasonable
grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence in the proceeding before the Commission, the court may order such ad-
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ditional evidence- to be taken before the Commission. The
Commission may thereupon modify its findings of facts, or
make new findings, filing such findings with the court, together
with a transcript of the additional evidence so taken, and its
recommendation for the modification or setting aside of its
original order. The jurisdiction of the circuit court of appeals
to enforce, modify or set aside the orders of the Commission
is exclusive; and their judgments and decrees are final, except
that the same may be reviewed by the Supreme Court upon
certiorari.
If the respondent desires to obtain a review of the Commission's order, he may do so by filing in the circuit court of
appeals a written petition, praying that such order be set aside.
A copy of such petition is thereupon served upon the Commission, it then files in court a transcript of the record, and
the case proceeds as in instances where the jurisdiction of the
court is invoked by the commission.
Section 2 of the Clayton Act declares that it shall be unlawful for any person, engaged in interstate commerce, in the
course of such commerce to discriminate in price between
different purchasers of commodities, where the effect of such
discrimination may be to substantially lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce. Exception is made, of course, so as to allow discrimination in price
between purchasers on account of differences in the quality or
quantity of the commodity sold, or differences in the cost of
selling or transportation, or discrimination in price made in
good faith to meet competition. Section 3 of the Clayton Act
prohibits the leasing or making a sale or contract for sale of
goods, wares, or merchandise, or fixing a price charged therefor, upon the condition that the lessee or purchaser thereof
shall not deal in the goods, wares, or merchandise of a competitor of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such a lease
or sale may be to substantially lessen competition or create a
monopoly in any line of commerce. Section 7 prohibits one
corporation, engaged in interstate commerce, from acquiring
or voting stock in another corporation, similarly engaged,
where the effect of such acquisition, or the use of such stock
by voting, granting of proxies, or otherwise, may be to substantially lessen competition between such corporations, or to
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restrain or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
Section 8 prohibits interlocking directorates. It prohibits
interlocking only in instances where at least one of the corporations, engaged in interstate commerce, has capital, surplus, and undivided profits in excess of one million dollars,
and where the corporations are or theretofore have been competitors, so that the elimination of competition between them
would be a violation of any of the anti-trust laws. Section 11
provides that, whenever the Commission shall have reason
to believe that any person is violating or has violated any of
the provisions of Sections 2, 3, 7 and 8 of the act, it shall issue
and serve upon such person a complaint, stating its charges
in that respect. The proceeding is conducted similarly to a
proceeding under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, above detailed, including the method of review by the
circuit court of appeals. If the Commission finds that the
respondent is violating any of the sections mentioned, its order
is that he cease and desist from such violation.
The above is a brief resume of the statutory provisions
relative to procedure. Please note that the machinery is set
in motion by the issuance of a formal complaint by the Commission. No one else can initiate a complaint. An aggrieved
individual, though, may call the Commission's attention to a
violation, and, after investigation, it may issue a formal complaint-in fact in ninety per cent. of the cases the beginning
is the filing of an informal complaint, by letter or other writing, by a competitor who is, or who imagines himself, badly
treated. As one former Commissioner frequently said, "The
injured competitors are the eyes of the Commission." Such
informant must give his name and address, and the name and
address of the party complained of. The identity of the informant is closely guarded and will not be divulged, nor will
any witness be allowed to testify in regard to it. Anonymous
complaints are ignored by the Commission.
As to the necessity of the Commission proceeding to file
a complaint under the Clayton Act or under the Trade Commission Act there is this difference: Section 11 of the Clayton
Act makes a proceeding mandatory if the Commission "has
reason to believe" that the Clayton Act has been violated,
whereas under Section 5 of the Trade Commission Act it has
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more discretion-it is ordered to proceed only if it has reason
to believe that the Act has been violated, and if it is made to
appear to the Commission that a proceeding by it "would be
to the interest of the public." The Commission construes this
provision as making proceedings under the Trade Commission
Act discretionary with it; nevertheless, soon after its creation
the docket of the Commission became crowded with a multitude of petty cases. One reason for this was the early declaration of the Commission that such practices as misbranding,
false advertising, commercial bribery and the like, were
legally and economically wrong, and must be stamped out.
The Commission was undoubtedly sincere in all these petty
prosecutions, though it may be difficult for us to perceive the
public interest in some of the disputes into which it injected
the strong arm of the Federal Government-such, for example, as controversies between manufacturers of an ink-remover, of a millinery glue, and between rival vendors of
orangeade in the District of Columbia. For its participation
in such trivial matters the Commission was severely criticized.
This resulted in a change of policy on its part, so that it is now
its policy to effect a settlement in small cases where the public
interest is not apparent. If the effort at settlement fails, the
parties are told that they must go to the courts for redress.
This policy was set forth at length in an amendment to its rules
of procedure, adopted March 17, 1925, from which I quote
as follows:
"Hereafter it shall bi the policy of the Commission not to entertain
proceedings of alleged unfair practices where the alleged violation of law is a
purely private controversy redressable in the courts except where said practices substantially tend to suppress competition as affecting the public. In all
such cases there must be three parties involved, the respondent, the competitor
injured, and the public. In cases where the alleged injury is one to a competitor only and is redressable in the courts by an action by the aggrieved
competitor and the interest of the public is not substantially involved, the
proceeding will not be entertained."

The statutes make no provision for a pleading by the repondent, evidently intending that the next step would be the
appearance of the respondent at the time and place set for
trial. The rules of practice of the Commission require, however, that within thirty days after service the defendant shall
file an answer, containing "a short and simple statement of
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the facts which constitute the ground of defense." The answer
is the only defensive pleading permitted. The Commission
declines to entertain any demurrer, motion to dismiss, motion
for bill of particulars, or motion to make the complaint more
specific. The Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act
require the respondent to show cause why an order should not
be issued, and contain no reference to the presentation of testimony in support of the Commission's complaint. Nevertheless, the trial counsel for the Commission assumes the burden
of going forward with the evidence. This is undoubtedly
done because the Commission's findings of fact must be supported by the testimony, or the order will be reversed by the
circuit court of appeals. Therefore the assumption of the
burden by the Commission is not as altruistic as it might seem
on first glance.
It is easy to appreciate that the Commission is really a
court. Practically speaking, it is much more. It is the complainant, the district attorney, the judge and the jury-a very
difficult role to play. It must have "reason to believe" that
the law has been violated before it issues a complaint-and
the facts in regard to the alleged violation must be considered
by the Commission, and the question of whether or not a complaint shall issue be passed upon by the Commission, itself,
and not left to examiners, or to counsel for the Commission.
But when the case comes on for trial, the Commission must
forget its preconceived notion of the respondent's guilt, and
make impartial findings of fact, based upon the evidence, and
issue an order thereon. Nevertheless, these are not the only
up-hill features with which the poor respondent has to contend. The Commission has, in practice, taken the position
that it is not bound by technical rules of evidence, and it has
been said that the Commission has never refused to give effect
to testimony on the ground that it was technically incompetent. This is, of course, similar to the practice in cases before
the Interstate Commerce Commission, in which, as one of my
fellow members of the Denver Bar says, "the witnesses argue
the cases under oath, and the lawyers testify without having
been sworn."
As above pointed out, the order of the Commission is
necessarily limited in scope. All that it can do is to order the
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respondent to cease and desist from the objectionable practice
or unfair method, or, if the order concerns Sections 7 or 8 of
the Clayton Act, to divest itself of the stock held, or rid itself
of the directors chosen contrary to law. As above shown, if
the respondent refuses to comply with the order, the Commission must take the case to the circuit court of appeals to get its
order enforced. Feeling keenly this lack of power to enforce
its own orders, for many years the Commission brought additional pressure to bear upon the respondent by enlisting the
aid of the press in giving great publicity to its proceedings,
beginning with its filing of the complaint, and continuing until
an order was issued and the respondent had complied with it.
I am glad to say, however, that this practice has now been
greatly curtailed.
The Commission files no opinions. The report of a case
before it consists usually of the complaint, the findings of fact
and the order of the Commission. In fact, this is about all
that the report of one of its cases could well include, since it
shows the facts and the ruling on them, though the Commission his been severely criticized for its failure to state the
reasons for its rulings. The Commission has, however, issued
conference rulings, which are merely expressions of opinion
on applications for the issuance of complaints and on informal
inquiries, involving the interpretation and construction of the
Trade Commission Act and of those sections of the Clayton
Act with the enforcement of which the Commission is charged.
These conference rulings are added to and amended from time
to time.
There is one other power of the Commission closely related to those we have been considering, which I think it well
to mention. Section 7 of the Trade Commission Act provides
that in any suit in equity brought by or under the direction
of the Attorney General, as provided in the anti-trust acts, the
court may upon the conclusion of the testimony, if it be of
opinion that the complainant is entitled to relief, refer such
suit to the Commission as a master in chancery to ascertain
and report an appropriate form of decree therein. In all its
years of life the Commission has never been called upon to act
as a master in chancery under the provisions of this section.
I turn now to the objectionable practices which the Com-
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mission has power to prevent. In its annual report for the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1919, the Commission thus construed its powers:
"Previous to the creation of the Commission, the courts had ruled upon
various forms of unfair practices. Their decisions are designated as cases
arising under the Common Law. But upon the creation of the Commission it
was empowered to leave the shores defined by it, to embark upon an uncharted
sea, using common sense plus the common law for its compass."

But the Commission was wrong. Subsequent judicial decisions have established that. The leading case on the subject
is Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, and,

in line with the decision in that case, the orders of the Commission as to unfair practices have been reversed whenever,
to use its own language, it has "left the shores defined by law,
and embarked on an uncharted sea." Nevertheless the figure
used by the Commission in its statement was a happy one. It
was an admission of an important fact-the Commission was
at sea.
In Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, supra, the re-

spondents were engaged in selling jute bagging, used for wrapping bales of cotton, and steel ties, used for binding the bales.
Their sales were principally to jobbers and dealers. They
refused to sell ties to a customer unless at the same time he
bought a corresponding amount of bagging. The Commission
held that this practice constituted an unfair method of competition and ordered the respondents to cease and desist from
requiring purchasers of ties to buy a proportionate amount
of bagging. The Circuit Court of appeals reversed the order
of the Commission and the case was brought to the Supreme
Court by certiorari. The Supreme Court made two holdings
which have ever since been used as guide by the Commission:
First,that the complaint must allege facts sufficient to charge
respondents with "unfair methods of competition in commerce", unaided by the testimony adduced at the hearing, and
Second, as above stated, that it is for the courts and not for the
Commission ultimately to determine as a matter of law what
the words "unfair methods of competition" indlude. Said
the Court on these two points:
"If, when liberally construed, the complaint is plainly insufficient to
show unfair competition within the proper meaning of these words there is
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no foundation for an order to desist-the thing which may be prohibited is
the method of competition specified in the complaint. Such an order should
follow the complaint; otherwise it is improvident and, when challenged, will
be annulled by the court.
"The words 'unfair method of competition' are not defined by the
statute and their exact meaning is in dispute. It is for the courts, not the
commission, ultimately to determine as matter of law what they include.
They are clearly inapplicable to practices never heretofore regarded as opposed
to good morals because characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud or oppression, or as against public policy because of their dangerous tendency unduly to
hinder competition or create monopoly. The act was certainly not intended to
fetter free and fair competition as commonly understood and practiced by
honorable opponents in trade."

A lengthy dissenting opinion was filed by Mr. Justice
Brandeis, in which Mr. Justice Clarke concurred.
In the early years of the existence of the Commission, the
number of cases before it which reached the courts were very
few. In the past few years, however, there has been a veritable
flood of them, many of which have gone to the Supreme Court.
I can therefore consider only the more important ones.
In Federal Trade Commission v. Raymond Bros.-Clark

Company, 263 U. S. 565, it was shown that the respondent was
engaged in the wholesale grocery business, and for some years
had bought groceries from the Snider Company, a manufacturer of groceries. The Basket Stores Company operated a
chain of retail grocery stores in the territory served by the
Raymond Cormpany, the wholesaler, but, on account of the
volume of business done by its chain of retail stores, the manufacturer had begun to sell to it direct. The Raymond Company thereupon withdrew its patronage from the Snider Company and announced that it would not again purchase goods
from it so long as it sold direct to the Basket Stores Company.
The Commission ruled that this method of competition was
prohibited by the Act, and issued an order to cease and desist.
The order of the Commission had been reversed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals when the case was taken to the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the Circuit
Court of Appeals, holding that a jobber's individual refusal
to purchase from a wholesaler dealing with a retailer was no
more than the exercise of the lawful right to buy or to refuse
to buy, and was not an unlawful method of competition.
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United States v. Colgate & Company, 250 U. S. 300, is
a case to which I wish to call your attention. I might remark
parenthetically that it was the Department of Justice and not
the Federal Trade Commission that prosecuted Colgate &
Company-I refer to the case simply to show the law as developed by it. The case was a prosecution under the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act for creating and engaging in a combination
of wholesale and retail dealers to maintain resale prices on
commodities sold to them by Colgate & Company. This was
effected by the refusal of Colgate & Company to sell in the
future to dealers who did not maintain the scale of resale prices
suggested by it. The Supreme Court held that in the absence
of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the Sherman
Act did not restrict the long recognized right of trader or
manufacturer, engaged in an entirely private business, freely
to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with
whom he will deal. It should be noted that in this case there
was no contract between Colgate & Company and the dealer
by which Colgate & Company attempted to fix the resale price,
nor was there any course of dealing by which such an agreement could be implied-Colgate would simply refuse to supply
further merchandise if the dealer did not respect its wishes in
that regard. The Supreme Court had already condemned
the practice of controlling, or attempting to control, the resale
price by contract as a restraint of trade and had declared it
invalid both at common law and under the Sherman Act.
We now come to the Beech-Nut Packing Company case.
That company, having the benefit of the plans of the other
manufacturers who had been" prosecuted, attempted to improve upon all of them. Its desire, of course, was to fix the
prices at which its products might be resold, so it adopted and
maintained a policy which it denominated the Beech-Nut
Policy. In order to secure the co-operation of its dealers and
to carry out this policy, the company refused to sell to pricecutters, insisted that its customers not sell to price-cutters, and
used its distributors, customers and agents in maintaining an
espionage system to discover who were cutting prices.
The Federal Trade Commission ordered the Beech-Nut
Company to cease and desist from directly or indirectly, or
by any means, bringing about the resale of Beech-Nut products
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by distributors, wholesale or retail, according to any system
of prices established by the Beech-Nut Packing Company.
The Commission was evidently of the opinion that the Trade
Commission Act gave it the power to declare that the refusal
to sell to distributors who cut prices was an "unfair method of
competition". The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit set aside the order of the Commission, and the case
was taken to the Supreme Court by certiorari. The Supreme
Court (257 U. S. 441) reaffirmed the right of a manufacturer
or dealer to refuse to sell goods to persons who would not sell
at stated prices, holding that the passage of the Federal Trade
Commission Act had made no difference in the right of a
manufacturer or dealer in this regard and to that extent set
aside the order of the Commission. It went further, though,
and in an opinion from which four members of the Court dissented, condemned the espionage system and the co-operative
methods by which the Beech-Nut Company, its distributors,
customers and agents, undertook to prevent others from obtaining the company's products at less than the prices designated by it, and to that extent upheld the Commission's order.
I turn now to Section 3 of the Clayton Act. That is the
section which makes it unlawful to lease or sell- goods, wares,
or merchandise on the condition that the lessee or purchaser
shall not use or deal in the goods, wares or merchandise of a
competitor. The Federal Trade Commission perceived a
flagrant violation of this section and of the laws of fair competition in the manner in which the Saturday Evening Post
was being distributed. The Curtis Publishing Company had
originated a system of retail sales through school-boys, and it
employed some fifteen hundred persons as exclusive agents to
train and superintend these boys and to devote their time and
attention to promoting sales. This contract was in writing,
and in it the distributor or agent agreed not to act as agent
for any other publisher, or to supply at wholesale rates any
periodicals other than those published by the Curtis Company,
without the written consent of the Curtis Company. Of these
fifteen hundred agents, 447 were wholesale dealers in newspapers and magazines before contracting with the Curtis
Company. Many of them had requested permission to distribute the periodicals of other publishers, but this permission
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had been uniformly refused. The Commission found that in
these ways the most efficient established channels of distribution had been closed to competitors of the Curtis Company,
competition lessened, and a tendency to monopoly established.
It found no objection to the practice, though, insofar as the
one thousand or more representatives were concerned who,
prior to their contracts, had not been engaged in selling and
distributing newspapers or periodicals for other publishers.
The case finally reached the Supreme Court (260 U. S. 568).
That court held that the form of contract with the representatives was one of agency, and not one of sale upon condition,
and thus disposed of the charges under the Clayton Act. It
also found that the practice described was not an unfair
method of competition, saying:
"The engagement of competent agents obligated to devote their time
and attention to developing the principal's business, to the exclusion of all
others, where nothing else appears, has long been recognized as proper and
unobjectionable practice. The evidence clearly shows that respondent's agency
contracts were made without unlawful motive and in the orderly course of
an expanding business. It does not necessarily follow because many agents
had been general distributors, that their appointment and limitation amounted
to unfair trade practice. And such practice cannot reasonably be inferred from
the other disclosed circumstances. Having regard to the undisputed facts,
the reasons advanced to vindicate the general plan are sufficient.
"Effective competition requires that traders have large freedom of action
when conducting their own affairs. Success alone does not show reprehensible
methods, although it may increase or render insuperable the difficulties which
rivals must face. The mere selection of competent, successful and exclusive
representatives in the orderly course of development can give no just cause for
complaint, and, when standing alone, certainly affords no ground for condemnation under the statute."

There is another point in this opinion which I wish to
mention briefly. The Commission had made findings of fact,
but there were other material facts shown by the evidence
which were not reported upon by the Commission. The Court
held that under such circumstances it could from the record
make findings of these additional facts, without sending the
case back to the Commission for the purpose, saying:
"Manifestly, the court must inquire whether the Commission's findings
of fact are supported by evidence. If so supported, they are conclusive. But
as the statute grants jurisdiction to make and enter, upon the pleadings, testimony and proceedings, a decree affirming, modifying or setting aside an order,
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the court must also have power to examine the whole record and ascertain for
itself the issues presented and whether there are material facts not reported by
the Commission. If there be substantial evidence relating to such facts from
which different conclusions reasonably may be drawn, the matter may be and
ordinarily, we think, should be remanded to the Commission-the primary
fact-finding body-with direction to make additional findings, but if from all
the circumstances it clearly appears that in the interest of justice the controversy should be decided without further delay the court has full power
under the statute so to do."

While not dissenting from the opinion of the court, Mr.
Chief Justice Taft expressed doubt as to the right of the court
to sum up the evidence pro and con on issues undecided by
the Commission where there is a conflict in the evidence, and
make itself the fact finding body. In this view Mr. Justice
Brandeis concurred.
Comparatively early in its life, the Federal Trade Commission had found a practice to be in vogue among the oil
refining companies which it attempted to abate. The oil companies were leasing underground tanks with pumps to retail
dealers at nominal prices upon the condition that the equipment should be used only with gasoline purchased from the
lessor. There was no effort to prevent the retail dealers from
handling the gasoline of other oil companies, the only restriction in that respect being that it could not be stored in or sold
from the equipment of the lessor. The evidence showed that
the percentage of retail dealers so handling the gasoline of
more than one oil company was negligible, though there were
a few that did. So in separate proceedings the Commission
prosecuted some thirty or more refiners and wholesalers, and
ordered them to abandon the practice mentioned. It found
that the practice was not only a violation of Section 3 of the
Clayton Act, but was also an "unfair method of competition,"
not only as against oil companies who did not make a practice
of furnishing such equipment, but also unfair as against the
manufacturers of and dealers in tanks and pumps, and as such
a violation of the Trade Commission Act. The orders in
various ones of the cases were reversed by the circuit courts of
appeals for four different circuits; but, emboldened by the success of some litigation in the lower courts in two other cases
for violations of Section 3 of the Clayton Act, the Commission
sought and obtained writs of certiorari,and took the cases to
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the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the prac.
tice complained of was not objectionable, and not a violation
of the Clayton Act or the Trade Commission Act, saying:
"The powers of the Commission are limited by the statutes. It has no
general authority to compel competitors to a common level, to interfere with
ordinary business methods or to prescribe arbitrary standards for those engaged
in the conflict for advantage called competition. The great purpose of both
statutes was to advance the public interest by securing fair opportunity for
the play of the contending forces ordinarily engendered by an honest desire
for gain. And to this end it is essential that those who adventure their time,
skill and capital should have large freedom of action in the conduct of their
own affairs."
Fed. Trade Com'n. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U. S. 463, 474.

From these cases it will be seen that in the early years of
its existence the Commission was really trying to take away
the advantages which were afforded by large capital, and to
put all competitors, large and small, on a common level. This
not only brought much criticism upon the Commission from
without, but it was also the source of much internal strife.
The conservative members of the Commission were constantly
and continuously lined up against the radical members. The
general discontent is shown by the fact that resignations from
the Commission have been the rule, rather than the exception,
and only one member of the Commission has ever served a
full appointive term of seven years.
For the greater part of its life, the Commission has been
a catch-all for every dispute arising between competitors in
commerce. The complaining party did not have to come out
into the open and prefer his charges-he merely started the
ball rolling by writing a letter of complaint to the Commission. He was relieved of the burden of employing counsel.
There were no court costs. If his competitor did not obey
the Commission's order, it was the Commission, and not he,
who invoked the aid of the circuit court of appeals. In fact
the Commission was the kind of a big brother worth having.
There are some critics who think that the complaining party
should be made to appear as plaintiff in the action before the
Commission, thus making the procedure before the Trade
Commission similar to that before the Interstate Commerce
Commission. But this could not be done without amending
the Trade Commission Act. In fact it is entirely foreign to
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the idea upon which the Act is drawn. There was no intent
to create a new forum into which competitors could bring
their private troubles for adjustment; the idea of the public
interest was paramount, and in cases where the public interest
was sufficiently clear to warrant the Commission in proceeding, it was the intention of Congress that the injured competitors should be relieved of all trouble and expense. This was
so because the benefit they would derive from the prosecution
was only incidental.
The principal errors which the Commission made during
the first half of its existence were in concerning itself with
trivial controversies and in using too much common sense and
not enough common law in deciding what methods of competition were unfair; and we must admit that during this time
the Federal Trade Commission was a severe disappointment.
The amendment to the rules of the Commission, above mentioned, to the effect that complaints must be to the "interest
of the public," has been a big help and was undoubtedly a
step in the right direction. It is only justice to say that,
previous to interpretation by the Supreme Court of the statutes
under which the Commission acts, its problem was a very
difficult one, and that it has not been slow in changing its ideas
and making reforms in order to conform to the decisions of
that court. The result of this is that in late years, when cases
from the Commission have reached the courts, its orders have
generally been upheld. Let us hope that in the future the
zeal of its members will not cause the Commission to fall into
new errors.

COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(Enrrot's Norr-It is intended in each issue of DICTA to print brief abstracts of
the decisions of the Supreme Court. These abstracts will be printed only after the
time within which a petition for rehearing may be filed has elapsed without such action being taken, or in the event that a petition for rehearing has been filed the abstract
will be printed only after the petition has been disposed of.)

APPEAL AND ERROR-BILL OF EXCEPTIONS-NO.

12,364-

Royal Exchange Assurance vs. Tritch Hardware Company,
et al-Decided October 14, 1929.
Facts.-The Hardware Company brought suit against
one Fox and the Assurance as garnishee answered that it owed
Fox $3,173.48 and judgment was entered for the Hardware
Company. Thereafter the Assurance asked leave to withdraw its garnishee's answer on the grounds of fraud, but the
petition was denied. The evidence purporting to back the
Assurance's petition is not before the Supreme Court by bill
of exceptions or in any other proper way.
Held.-The necessary evidence not being before the
Court in the correct manner, it cannot be considered. The
rules of court require a bill of exceptions.
Judgment Affirmed.
APPEAL AND ERROR-INTERVENTION-PLEADING
TICE-ON REHEARING-No. 12,434-Prince

AND PRAC-

Hall Grand
Lodge, Etc. vs. Hiram Grand Lodge, et al, and the Grand
Lodge, intervenor-Decided September 16, 1929.
Facts.-Underthe opinion handed down in this case September 16, 1929, the Court held that the writ of error should
be dismissed because of the failure of plaintiff in error to file
a bill of exceptions.
The only parties before the Court for the re-hearing are
the plaintiff in error, Prince Hall Lodge, and the Intervenor,
Grand Lodge. This cause began as a suit between Prince
Hall Lodge and Hiram Lodge for an adjudication between
them of the rights to Masonic names, emblems, etc. The
Grand Lodge asked authority from the District Court to file
a petition in intervention. Prince Hall Lodge filed its objections to the Grand Lodge's application for leave to intervene, alleging many argumentative facts. Grand Lodge was
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then permitted by the trial Court to intervene as a claimant
adverse to both Prince Hall and Hiram. Thereafter Prince
Hall filed what appeared to be a special demurrer to the petition in intervention, also alleging many extraneous facts. The
demurrer was over-ruled, but Prince Hall neither elected to
stand on its demurrer nor did it answer within the time limited
by the trial Court. Some time after Prince Hall was in default for failure to answer, the cause was tried in District
Court. At that time Prince Hall, through its counsel, stated
to the Court that the Grand Lodge had a right to Masonic
names and insignia superior to Prince Hall and of the other
alleged Masonic bodies in Colorado.
Held.-The case might well be decided in favor of the
Intervenor simply because of the failure of plaintiff in error
to present a bill of exceptions to the Supreme Court. In addition to this reason, the judgment is affirmed because, (1) the
statement contained in Prince Hall's objection to the filing
of the petition in intervention and in the special demurrer
to this petition cannot be considered; (2) the only question
being litigated is the right of the Grand Lodge to the exclusive
use of Masonic names and insignia, and this was admitted by
counsel for Prince Hall; (3) this Court cannot take judicial
notice of the use of Masonic names or prerogatives or the
ownership of property, as it has been requested to do by counsel for Prince Hall.
Judgment Affirmed.
STOCKHOLDERS No. 11,989 - Mountain
States Packing Company, et al, vs. J. H. Curtis, et al.Decided October 14, 1929.
Facts.-Sigmanowned 850 out of 2,500 shares of the capital stock of the K. & B. Company, and later bought 1255 shares
owned by the Mountain States Packing Company. The latter
company had 60,000 shares of preferred stock and also 60,000
shares of common stock, of which 23,586 were issued to one
Melville as Trustee. Later, Melville received 5,000 shares
of this common stock for legal services, and in 1927 he returned to the company the trustee stock. Defendants in error
seek (1) to set aside the agreement under which Melville held
the Trustee stock; (2) to set aside the sale of the K. & B.
CORPORATIONS -
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Company stock to Sigman; and (3) to set aside the transfer
of the 5,000 shares of stock to Melville for legal services.
Held.-Melville's return of the trustee stock and the fact
that it was used at stockholders' meetings only to make a quorum render it impossible to grant the first request of defendants in error. As to the second point, the sale to Sigman was
approved by a great majority of the Packing Company's stockholders. The third point is not well taken because the evidence shows that Melville had been under-compensated for
his services to the Packing Company, not over-paid. To interfere with the foregoing transactions would take the control
of corporations away from the stockholders and put it in the
courts, and in the absence of fraud, the decisions of the majority of the stockholders must stand as the decisions of the
corporations.
Judgment Reversed with Directions.
DISBARMENT-CONTEMPT-NO.

12,423-People vs. Humbert

-Decided November 12, 1929.

Facts.-Humbert, formerly an attorney of this Court,
was disbarred in 1920. Thereafter for about seven years, he
permitted his name and office address with a designation
"lawyer" or "attorney" to appear in the Denver Directory,
the Colorado Directory, and the Denver Telephone Directory.
Held.-Even though Humbert did not actively cause the
words "lawyer" or "attorney" to appear after his name in
various directories, yet if he passively permitted these publications to continue with such a designation after his name,
it must have been done with his knowledge. These were continuing advertisements, and even though put in circulation by
others it was his duty, after disbarment, to see that they were
discontinued, and such failure constituted contempt. Respondent found guilty of contempt.
DISMISSAL-CONTINUANCE--MINR-No.

12,183-Rausch v.

Cozian-Decided October 28, 1929.

Facts.-Suit was brought by a minor by her next friend
for damages received by being struck by defendant's automo-

DICTA

bile. When the case was called for trial, the plaintiff could
not attend the trial on account of having chronic appendicitis;
whereupon plaintiff's counsel asked for a continuance until
the next morning. Continuance denied, whereupon plaintiff's attorneys refused to proceed with the trial and judgment
was entered for defendant.
Held.-A litigant has a right to be present to assist his
counsel in the trial; and his necessary absence is a good reason
for a continuance. The plaintiff is a minor and ward of the
Court, and under such circumstances, the Court is in duty
bound to protect her rights, which cannot be waived either
by her guardian ad litem or her attorneys.
Judgment Reversed.
DIVORCE-NO. 12,162-Hagge vs. Hagge-Decided October

21, 1929 (On Rehearing.)
Facts.-Plaintiff below was awarded a preliminary decree of divorce and defendant below then filed a motion to
set aside the findings of fact and conclusions of law. Thereafter a final decree in favor of plaintiff below was entered.
Both the findings of fact and the final decree were based upon
conflicting evidence.
Held.-There was sufficient evidence to sustain the findings of fact and the final decree.
Judgment Affirmed.
12,184
-City of Denver vs. Ben Tondall, et al-Decided October
21, 1929.
Facts.-The City in pursuance of a plan to straighten the
Platte River instituted an action under the eminent domain
statute. The Commission appointed to award compensation
for property taken or damaged made its report in which one
Heimbecker, the owner of some of the property affected, did
not acquiesce. There was a trial to a jury, which awarded
Heimbecker compensation at the rate of $238.00 per lot for
the land taken and $1,500.00 a lot for land damaged. There
was no evidence to indicate any difference in the values of the
lots taken and the lots damaged.
EMINENT DOMAIN-VALUATIONS OF PROPERTY-No.
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Held.-The jury was permitted to speculate on the damages and the amount awarded for the property damaged is
obviously excessive.
Judgment Reversed.
NON-SUIT-INDEFINITE VERDICT-MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

-No. 12,398-Southern Surety Company vs. PetersonDecided October 7, 1929.
Facts.-Peterson had judgment against the Surety Company in Justice Court, and upon appeal, in County Court.
The action is on a policy compensating for personal injuries.
The company asserts error on the grounds that (1) the County
Court should have granted it a non-suit; (2) the judgment is
uncertain in amount in that it is for a definite sum "plus legal
rate of interest"; and (3) failure of proof.
Held.-(1) The Company was not entitled to a non-suit
because it did not specify the grounds therefor; (2) Peterson's counsel have waived the indefinite sum of interest, and
this cures this alleged defect; (3) the company did not object
to the matters constituting the third objection, and these points
cannot be raised now.
Judgment Affirmed.
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